PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As

MARKED

BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

In New Jersey it would seem that an attorney has a lien on
the money collected for his client, to the extent of his compensation for services. In deciding that such a
Attorneys'
lien cannot be destroyed by the employment of a
Charges.
new attorney, Vice-Chancellor Pitney, in Trust
Co. v. Paper Mill Co., 44 Atl. 638, gives some interesting
information as regards the question of costs between the
attorney and client and between the parties, under the English
and American rules.
BANKS AND BANKING.

De Weese v. Smith, 97 Fed. 309, is a decision by Judge
Phillips of the Circuit Court (W. D. Mo.) which,'if affirmed
by the Circuit Court of Appeals, may impose a
National
Bank, Action serious limitation upon the power of the cormpby Receiver,
Two Assessnients by

troller of the currency and may prove a blow to

creditors of insolvent national banks. The compComptroler troller had directed the receiver of the bank, in this
case, to collect 75 per cent. from the stockholders,
which was done, but finding that the sum collected was insufficient to meet the liabilities, he made a second assessment of
25 per cent. In an action by the receiver against a stockholder to collect the amount of the second assessment, it was
held, (I) that the comptroller had exhausted his power when
he had levied the first assessment, and (2) even if the second
assessment was valid, the amount could not be recovered,
since the liability of the stockholder was a single one, which
must be enforced in a single action by the receiver or not at
all, according to the common law rule that an entire cause of
action may not be split up in separate suits.
Where a bank has paid money on a check, to which a
material indorsement has been forged, the bank is liable, unless
Forged Check, the depositor is guilty of such negligence as would
Duty of
estop him from claiming against the bank. The
Depositor

Court of Appeals of New Jersey has decided that

where an indorsement has been forged, the mere fact that the
104
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depositor keeps the returned check in his possession without
informing the bank of the forgery is not negligence, in the
absence of proof that he is acquainted with handwriting of
the indorser: Mech. Nat. Bank v. Harter,44 Atl. 715.
Rev. St. (U. S.), § 5136, empowers national banks "to exercise . .
. all such incidental powers as shall be necessary
to carry on the business of banking," etc. Under
Powerof
National Bank
to Assume
Control of
Another Bank

this section, it was held by the Circuit Court of

Appeals, Eighth Circuit, that a national bank
possessed the power to buy out another bank and
to assume its liabilities in consideration of the
transfer to the former of all the property, real and personal,
and outstanding accounts of the latter : Schofield v. State Nat.
Bank of Denver, 97 Fed. 283.
CARRIBRS.

The Supreme Court of Illinois, following the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Express Cases, I17 U. S. i,
has decided that a railroad may make a valid conContract
tract with an express company, and the employes
Exempting.

Carrierfrom
Liability
for
Negligence

to Express

.

thereof, exempting itself from liability for negligence to such employes: Blank v. .l. Cent. R. Co.,
55 N. E. 332. The ground of the decision is that

the railroad is under no public duty'to furnish
facilities to express companies, and the doctrine
of non-exemption from liability for negligence applies only to
cases where the railroad is under such a public duty. Magruder, J., dissented.
nessenger

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

In 1899 the Legislature of Colorado passed a law limiting
the time of work of employes in underground mines to eight
Eight Hour hours. This law was attacked as a violation of
La-w for
the provisions of the constitution of Colorado,
tliners
which guarantee its citizens freedom of life, liberty and property, to the same effect as the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The
Supreme Court of Colorado declared the law unconstitutional,
as being within the above prohibition and not within the
reserved police powers: In re Morgan, 58 Pac. 1071.
It will be remembered that a couple of years ago a precisely similar law of Utah was upheld by the Supreme Court
of the United States, as being a valid exercise of the State
police power and not opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment:
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. In the opinion of Justice
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Brown, in the latter case, the decision was based partly on a
provision of the Utah constitution, giving the Legislature
special supervisory power over the work of miners, but there
was a strong dictum to the effect that such a law would come,
independently of this special power, within the implied police
powers of the State. However, in Tn re Morgan, supra, the
Supreme Court of Colorado refused to follow this dictum,
and intimated that Justice Brown was wrong. The attitude
assumed by the Colorado court is certainly novel. There
have been innumerable instances of cases where State courts
have persisted in declaring State laws to be within the police
power, until called sharply to task by the Supreme Coprt of
the United States, but this is the first one brought to our
attention where the Federal Supreme Court has intimated
that a law would fall within the police powers, and the State
court has thereupon decided that it would not. The opinion
of Campbell, C. J., of the Supreme Court of Colorado,
includes a long tirade on the inalienable right of the American
workman to be forced to work in a mine as long as his
employer chooses, very much on the style of the latter part
of the opinion in Goodcharlesv. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, which
is cited with approval.
CONTRACTS.

The plaintiff deposited collateral with a bank, of which he
was a customer, under an agreement whereby it was provided
Pledge with that the plaintiff authorized the bank at its option
Bank, To
at any time to apply the collateral to the payment
what Debts of any liability of the plaintiff to the bank,
Applicable
whether said liability existed at the time or should
be created afterwards. Subsequently the bank bought a dishonored promissory note, made by the plaintiff, from the
payee, and endeavored to apply the above collateral to its
payment. The Court of Appeals of New York, in an elaborate opinion, decided that the agreement contemplated only
those debts which would arise in the ordinary course of business between the plaintiff and the bank, and it did not include
the purchase by the bank of a matured liability against the
plaintiff: Gillet v. Bank of America, 55 N. E. 292.
A shrewd broker should not allow the payment of his commission to depend upon the completion of the sale. In Owen
Brokers' Corn- v. Ramsey, 55 N. E. 247, the broker, by allowing
missions,
such a stipulation in his contract, lost his comWhen
mission. The contract, under which he was to
Payable
sell bonds, provided that his commission should
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be deducted from the payment for the bonds. He found a
purchaser who was able and willing to take the bondg, but
before the transaction was completed, the bonds were declared
illegal and void and their delivery enjoined. The broker
strenuously contended for the application of the principle that
in real estate transactions the right of the broker becomes
fixed when he produces a purchaser, no matter whether the
conveyance is made or not, but the Supreme Court of Indiana
decided that the above provision in the contract made a sale
and payment conditions precedent to the recovery of the commission.
Unlike the lax rule adopted in Pennsylvania, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire holds that evidence of parol stipuContract of lations of the agent of a corporation, made previSubscription ous to, or contemporaneous with, the execution
to stock,
of a written contract of subscription to stock, is
Variance
inadmissible to vary the terms of the contract:
by Parol
S/hattuck v. Robbins, 44 AtI. 69 4. In the latter
case it was scarcely necessary for the court to go this far,
because the representations of the agent were not as to the
existence of a fact, but were merely the expressions of the
agent's opinion that the corporation would act in a certain
manner.
Plaintiff made a contract with the City of New York to
reline the basin of one of the city ponds, one of the provisions
extra Allow- of the contract being, "All loss or damage arising
ance,
out of the nature of the work to be done under
Unforeseen
this agreement, or from any unforeseen obstrucDifficulties tions or difficulties which may be encountered in
the prosecution of the same, or from the action of the elements, or from incumbrances on the line of the work...
shall be sustained by the contractor." It was also provided
that the plaintiff should remove the water from the pond.
There was a drain pipe to the pond, by which most of the
water could be drawn off, leaving but a few feet for the contractor to pump off; but when the work was commenced, it
was discovered that the drain pipe was completely blocked up.
The plaintiff was therefore obliged to pump out the whole ot
the water, and he brought suit against the city for the extra
work which he had done, at the request of the city engineer,
in pumping off the water.
The Court of Appeals of New York decided that even
under the clause above quoted the city was liable for the extra
work, since both parties had entered into the contract presum-
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ably on the understanding that the drain pipe would work;
therefore the difficulty did not arise "under the agreement,"
but entirely outside of the agreement, and therefore without
the scope of the provision making the plaintiff responsible:
Horganv. Mayor, etc., of New York, 55 N. E. 204 (Gray and
O'Brien, JJ., dissenting).
CORPORATIONS.

Fidelity Ins., etc., Co. v. Mechanics' Say. Bank, 97 Fed. 297,
a case which has been attracting some attention, has been
lately decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
Liabilityof
Stockholder Third Circuit. It appears that a statute of Kansas
when:Sued by provides that after a corporation creditor has rea Corporation covered a judgment against the corporation, which
he is unable to satisfy, he way. bring an action at
Creditor
law, for his own benefit, against any .5tockholder, and may
recover against the latter for an amount equal to the value of
his stock. In the above action, which wals brought against a
Pennsylvania stockholder in the Circuit Court (W. D. Penna.),
the defendant pleaded, inter alia, that the corporation was
indebted to him in an amount equal to that for Which the
plaintiff sued. It was held, (i) that the liability of the defendant was to be determined by the law of Kansas, since the
obligation had accrued in that jurisdiction, and (2) that since
this was an action by a separate creditor against the stockholder,
the set-off was allowable, although if it had been an action by
the receiver of the corporation for the benefit of all the creditors, such a defence would not have been available. While
basing his decision upon the law of Kansas, Judge Acheson,
in his opinion, approves of the above rule.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has affirmed the now familiar
rule that a corporation may, in issuing stock, reserve a valid
to
Lien of Corpo lien thereon for future debts of the stockholder
the corporation, provided notice of the lien appears
rationon
on the certificate. In Stafford v. ProduceBankizg
Stock for
Co., 55 N. E. 162, the principle was applied to the
ofdebteodes
of Stoder

extent of holding the lien valid, even though the

indebtedness did not arise until after the stockholder had
transferred his certificate to a bona fide purchaser, but before
the latter had perfected the transfer on the books of the
corporation. Counsel for the transferee strongly urged the
special capacities doctrine of corporations, contending that the
charter did not expressly authorize the corporation to reserve
a lien of this character. To this the Court replied, "Since the
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right to enter into contracts is general, and denied only when
prohibited by statute, or some consideration of public policy
recognized by the courts, it would be more helpful, perhaps,
to inquire for the statutory provision or the consideration of
public policy by which this contract is forbidden. It is quite
true that with respect to the franchises which corporations
exercise, and in their dealings with the public, the statute is
to be regarded as the source of their authority. But it would
be difficult to maintain the proposition that in their transactions with their stockholders, or in the transactions of the
stockholders among themselves, general rules do not apply, if
consistent with the statute."
Several cases denying this
power to national banks were distinguished on the ground
that the National Banking Act prohibits such contracts.
Following the Supreme Court of the United States in
Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U. S. 319, and Scovill v. Thayer, 1O5
U. S. 143, the Supreme Court of Maine has
insolvent
Corporation,
Liability of
SWckholders.]

decided that no action may be brought by the
assignee of an insolvent corporation against a
stockholder to recover the amount due on his

stock, until the amount of the stockholder's liability has been
fixed by the insolvency court: Gillin v. Sawyer, 44 Atl. 677.
In this case the assignee attempted to prove the exact state of
the corporation's assets and liabilities on the trial of the action
against the stockholder, but the court disregarded such proof.
To the same effect is De Weese v. Smitli, 97 Fed. (Circ. Ct.,
W. D. Mo.) 309, which holds that the statute of limitations
does not begin to run in favor of a stockholder in an insolvent
national bank until an assessment has been made by the comptroller of the currency, determining the amount of the stockholder's liability.
In modern times an information in the nature of a quo warranto is -regarded as a remedy of a civil nature rather than
criminal. Therefore the information need not
state the offence with such particularity and cerNature,
tainty as is required in an indictment: Ind. Mved.
Coll. v. People, ex. rel. Att'y Gen., 55 N. E. (Ill.) 345.
CRIMINAL LAW.

The so-called "Osteopaths" have been attacked in Ohio
under the statute making it illegal for a person not a registered
Oateopathy, physician or surgeon to "direct or recommend for'
Practice of the use of any person, any drug or medicine or
Medicine,
other agency for the treatment, cure or relief of
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any wound, fracture or bodily injury, infirmity or disease" (92
Ohio Laws, p. 44,§ 44o3 f. ). In State v. Liffiing, 55 N. E.
i68, the osteopath was charged with recommending "a certain
agency, to wit, a system of rubbing and kneading the body"
for the cure of a person. The Supreme Court of Ohio, while
refusing to decide whether or not an osteopath was a surgeon
or not, held that "rubbing" or "kneading" did not come
within the term "agency" under the statute, but that the latter
term, on the principle of noscitur a sociis, must be confined to
that which is similar to drugs and medicines, and did not
include mere manual treatment; in fact, the court strongly
intimated that the addition of the word " agency" did not
materially broaden the scope of the term, "any drug or medicine." An order sustaining a demurrer to the indictment was
therefore affirmed.
DEEDS.
Salvage v. Haydock, 44 Atl. (N. H.) 697, affirms the generally prevailing rule that possession under a defectively recorded
Recording, deed is constructive notice to a subsequent granConstructive tee. Some courts hold that it is not of itself conNotice.
structive notice, but itmerely casts upon the grantee the duty of making reasonable inquiries as to the possessor's title.
EVIDENCE.
While it is improper to instruct tfie jury that the fact that a
witness is interested weighs ag'arist"the value of his testimony,
Interested
yet the trial judge may, and it is his duty on
witn~e,
request, to call the'attention of the jury to the fact
Instruction of the witness's interest, and to allow the jury to
of Jury.
give what weight to it they choose. In State v.
Carey, 55 N. E. 261, a prosecution for bastardy, the trial judge
instructed the jury that in determining the credibility of the
relatrix, who had testified, they might take into consideration
the fact that she was interested in the result of the suit, but
that this fact would not permit them to give her evidence any
less or greater weight than if they were considering her evidence in a case of another kind in which she might be interested. Held, by the Appellate Court of Indiana, that this
instruction did not invade the province of the jury.
eXRCUTIONS.
In accordance with the weight of authority, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts has decided that where a levy upon
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personal property has been made under an execusumption that the judgment of the creditor has

Eifeto Levy, tion, to which no return has been made, no prePresumption

been satisfied in whole or in part, but the burden is on the
debtor to prove such satisfaction: Smith v. Condon, 55 N. E.
324.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

The fact that a wife refuses to attend to her husband during
his illness, when his means would enable him to hire a nurse,
does not amount to "cruel "treatment on the part
Divorce,
Cruel
of the wife under a statute granting a divorce
Treatment
for such a cause: Bonney v. Bonney, 55 N. E.
(Mass.) 461.
INFANCY.

The Court of Appeals of New York has properly decided
that injustice may not be committed under the plea of infancy.
Recission of In Rice v. Butler, 55 N. E. 275, the plaintiff; being
Infant's Con- 17 years of age, purchased a bicycle from the detract, Return fendant on the installment plan, used it for several
forBenefit
years and paid a number of installments. On comReceived
ing of age she disaffirmed the contract, returned the
bicycle and sued to recover the installments paid. The defendant claimed that the use of the wheel and its deterioration in
value exceeded the sum paid. Assuming that the latter fact was
true, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court
reversed a judgment for plaintiff, since otherwise the plaintiff
"would be making use of the privilege of infancy as a sword,
and not as a shield." It would seem, however, that the
Massachusetts courts have adopted a contrary rule: McCarthy
v. Henderson, 138 Mass. 310; Payne v. Wood, 145 Mass. 558.
JUDGMENTS.

Where judgment has been obtained on a coupon cut from
a bond, and an action is subsequently brought on another
Res Judicata, coupon from the same bond, even by the party to
Bonds,
the first action or his privy, the former judgment
Judgment on does not operat6 as an estoppel on the ground
Coupons
that the causes of the two actions are the same,
but it is iicumbent on the party alleging the conclusiveness of
the judgment to aver and prove that the precise question
before the court has been considered and decided in the
action on the former coupon: Board of Commissioners v.
Sudi 97 Fed. (Circ. Ct. of App., 8th Circ.), 270.
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MASTER AND SERVANT.

In Saunders v. Eastern Iydraulic Co., 44 At. 630, the
defendant employed a glazier to replace a pane of glass in a
skylight in roof. In performing the work, the
smRion glazier sat down on the roof and while leaning
of Rsk

ro

n

enn

over, in order to .support himself, rested his weight
upon the mullion which held the glass in the skylight. The
mullion broke, and the glazier brought this action for negligence, contending that defendant had not furnished him a safe
place in which to work. The Court of Appeals of New
Jersey, in affirming judgment for the defendant, held that the
only duty resting upon defendant was to make the mullion
strong enough to bear the weight of the glass, and not that
of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff, in attempting to make
the mullion perform a service for which it had not been
reasonably intended, had assumed the risk.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

A municipality may pass a valid ordinance forbidding th&
performance of worldly labor on Sunday, but such an ordinance must be of general application and must not
Sunday
Ordinances, be directed against a particular trade .or class 6f
Uniformity traders. Therefore, an ordinance of the City of
Denver, prohibiting the sale on Sunday of clothing and certain
other enumerated articles only, was properly held void by the
Supreme Court of Colorado: Denver v. Bach, 58 Pac. lO89.
PARTNERSHIP.

In an action by a firm creditor to hold a special partner in a
limited partnership as a general partner, it was alleged that
the capital required from the special partner had
Spcdin
never been paid in. The Court of Appeals of
Partner as
New York held (I) that the rule that partnership
General
books are evidence against the partners in favor
Partner,
of outside parties applies to the case of a limited
Evidence
partnership as well as of a general partnership;
therefore the books were admissible against the special partner; and (2) that the fact that no entry appeared on the books,
showing the payment by the special partner of his capital,
warranted the court below in finding as a fact that the statement in the certificate, that the capital had been paid in, was
false: Hotop. v. Huber, 55 N. E. 206.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

Except in New York, it seems doubtful whether the practice of withdrawing a juror in civil cases at the plaintiff's
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request, so that there may be a mistrial, exists in
this country. In deciding that in Oregon the
plaintiff had no right to such withdrawal, Justice
Bean, of the Supreme Court of Oregon, gives a history of the
practice as it existed in England. Usborne v. Stephenson, 58
Pac. 1103.
Withdrawal
of J rorIn
Civil Cases

REAL PROPERTY.

In Indiana, when the title of a grantee has been divested by
breach of a condition subsequent, the grantor must re-enter
before he is entitled to bring ejectment. Thus in
Breach of
Condition,
Preston v. Bosworth, 55 N. E. 224, a lease of a gas
R-Fntry
property provided that ifthe grantee should abandon the well, the title should at once revert to and vest in the
grantor. In an action by the grantor against the grantee to
recover the land, the plaintiff's complaint alleged a breach ot
condition, but not a re-entry by the plaintiff A demurrer to
the complaint was sustained by the Supreme Court of Indiana,
on the ground that the breach itself was not self-operative to
divest the grantee's title, since it might have been waived.
A warranty of title in a deed is broken as soon as the deed
is executed, where the grantor has not a perfect title. The
Court of Appeals of Kansas has applied this rule
Breach of
Warranty of to a case where the defect in the grantor's title
Title,
was not apparent to the vendee. The deed was
When Broken executed in 1882, but the vendee did not discover
the defect until 1889. Held, that his lack of knowledge did
not prevent the Statute of Limitations from running against
him from 1882: Jewett v. Fisher,58 Pac. 1023.
In Lambe v. Drayton, 55 N. E. 189, land was devised to A.
and her heirs, "to hold the said real estate to A., her lifetime." On A.'s death it was directed that the tessh
Ct Down tator's executors should divide the land among
to a Life

his children.

The Supreme Court of Illinois held,

Estate, Power (I) that the rule illustrated in Tyler v. Moore, 42

Pa. 376, that where the premises of a conveyance
grant a fee, the provision in the habendum that the grantee
shall take only a life estate, is inoperative, applies to wills as
well as to deeds, though of course if the premises of a will do
not expressly grant a fee, the intention expressed in the habendum will control, and (2) since A. took a fee, the remainder
over was void.
While the decision was correct, the reasoning of the. Court
ofDisposition
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in regard to the second proposition is peculiar. Of course it
is plain that after the testator had given A. a fee, he could not
turn around and give her an estate for life with a vested remainder over; but the Court treats the case as if it were one
of an executory devise. It first quotes a rule from Kent's
Commentaries, that "a valid executory devise cannot subsist
under an absolute power of disposition in the first taker."
Then it goes on to say that, "here the remainder over to the
children attempted to be given by the third clause of the will
was void, because by the first clause the preceding fee had
been given to the widow, A.; and as the fee simple title,which
had been given to her, included and involved the absolute
power of disposition, the remainder in the third clause was
void by way of executory devise." Now this rule of Chancellor Kent, whatever may be its logical sufficiency, is well
recognized in New York and several other States, but it would
seem that in the present case the court has misconstrued it in
attempting to apply it to the facts at bar. The only case
where the rule applies is where the limitation over is made
upon the contingency that the first taker disposes, or does not
dispose, of the land, for in such a case only is there an "implied power of disposition in the first taker." In-the present
case there was no such implied power as will be seen from a
glance at the limitation, any more than there is an implied
power of disposition in a limitation "to A. and his heirs, and
if he dies unmarried, to B.," in which case it is admitted that
Chancellor Kent's rule does not apply.
Perhaps the courts of the various States of the United
States are almost equally divided upon the question whether
or not the vendor of land by a deed absolute on
its face has a lien on the land for the purchase
Venor's
Lien.

money. In Baker v. Fleming, 59 Pac. joi, the
question was presented for the first time before the Supreme
Court of Arizona. Davis, J., in a lengthy opinion, reviews
the authorities on the subject and comes to the conclusion
that the rule of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and other States,
denying the existence of the lien, is more logical and fair,
and is therefore the rule to be adopted in the territory ot
Arizona.
A. granted a strip of land to a railroad and covenanted that
he (without mention of his assigns) would build a division
covemmt to fence, or not hold the railroad liable for injury to
Bund.Fence,

cattle.

A. then conveyed the remainder of his land
had notice of the covenant Held,by

Runnlng with to B., who

Lad.
the Supreme Court of Oregon, that under the
second resolution in S~encer's 6ase,the covenant, pertaining as
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it did to a thing not in esse, was personal to A. and did not run
with the land in the absence of mention of A.'s "assigns" in
the deed: Brown v. South. Pac. Railway Co., 58 Pac. 1 1O5.
According to the Massachusetts rule, the liability of one

who collects water in a trough or gutter and discharges it
Discharge of upon the land of another, is an absolute liability
Waters on

Neighboring

and is not based upon negligence.

Therefore, in

Fitzpatrick v. Welsh, 55 N. E. 178, the Supreme

Court of Massachusetts affirmed the lower court in
its refusal to charge that in such a case the plaintiff could not
recover if the defendant had used ordinary care in the construction of the roof and gutter which accidentally threw the
water upon the plaintiff's land.
PrPorty.

S T-OFF.
Where an action is brought against a builder under the
Mechanics' Lien Law of New Jersey (2 Gen. Star. 2o67), the
builder may not employ a set-off which has not
arisen from the transaction upon which the suit is
Builder,
brought. And this notwithstanding § i of the
same act, which provides that the defendant shall have "any
defence or plea the builder might have to any action on the
contract without this act" : Naylor v. Smith, 44 Atl. (N. J.) 649.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

The Kansas statute of frauds applies to contracts not to be
performed within one year from the making thereof In Plhenix
Parol Contract Ins. Co. v. Ireland, 58 Pac. 1024, the Court of
of Reinsurance Appeals of Kansas decided that a parol contract
from Year to between the insurance company and the insured,
Year.

that the policy should be renewed from year to

year, which agreement was terminable upon notice by either
party, was not within the statute and was valid. The case
principally relied upon was Trustees of Baptist Church v.
Brooklyn Ins. Co., ig N. Y. 305, affirmed in 28 N. Y. 153.
§URETYSHIP.

The Supreme Court of Indiana has applied with some
harshness the rule that a surety is released by reason of the
Arterstlon of

Instrument
*UnderAgremeatWith'
Surety

alteration of the instrument without his consent.
In Moore v. Hinshaw, 55 N. E. 236, an agreement
was made between all the parties that a note bearing interest at eight per cent should be made, with
one of them as surety. In pursuance of the agree-
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ment a note was drawn with the interest space left blank, and,
while in this condition, was signed by the principal and the
surety. Afterwards the provision for eight per cent. interest
was filled in by the payee in the absence of the surety. In an
action against the surety, it was held that, as the note would
have borne only six per cent. interest if the clause had been
left blank (under a statute of Indiana), the subsequent alteration in the absence of the surety discharged him, even though
the provision for eight per cent. interest was a part of his contract. This decision certainly carries to the limit the rule of
suretyship upon which it is based.

SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS.

In Cooperv. Shore ElectricCo., 44 Ati. 633, an action for death
by negligence was brought by the administrator of the deceas-ed
for the benefit of the father of the deceased, under
Aeato bor the New Jersey act of March 3, 1848 (I G'eri. St.
Death by
Wrongful Act, I888, §§ IO, II),providing that such action Should
Death of Pr- be brought by the personal representative for the
The decedent left
nt ed benefit of the next of kin.
so

also a mother, brothers and sisters. Pending the
action, the decedent's father, the beneficiary, died. In a
learned opinion, giving a r~sum6 of the decisions on the doctrine of actio personafis, etc., the Court of Appeals of New
Jersey decided that the action did not abate, but might be continued for the benefit of. the other parties entitled under the
statute.
WILLS.
A., whose residence is New York, went to live temporarily
with her daughter, B., in Saxony, where she executed a will
Conflict of,

in favor of "B. and her lawful issue."

The ques-

Law,". Law- tion was whether a child, who had been lawfully
iul
Issu " adopted by B. according to the laws of Saxony,

could share as one of the "lawful issue." Held, (I) that *in
the interpretation of the will the law of New York and -not
that of Saxony must govern, as being that of the testator's
domicile, even though the will was executed elsewhere; ()
that therefore, notwithstinding the Saxon law, the adopted
child was not entitled, since under the New York decision's
the expression "lawful issue" was confined to actual descendants: N. Y. Life Ins. v. Viele, 55 N. E. (N. Y.) 31.
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The testator made a bequest to his wife "in lieu of dower,
and of any right which she might have in my personal estate
as widow." The residue of the estate was divided
Widow as
,
",1nefaary" among the "beneficiaries" of the will. It was
contended that the widow was not a" beneficiary,"
slrnie she had relinquished a valuable right for her legacy and
therefore was not really "benefited," but the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts thought that the testator's intention was
clear to include her within the class: Wood v. Packard,55 N.
E. 315.

